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Another factor supporting this view is that there is a possibility
that the public policy idea behind the common law right of abandonment and the later Wreck Act is not as compelling today as formerly. For example, ships today are substantially different than they
were prior to 19oo. They are, for the most part, larger and are made
of metal rather than wood, and therefore upon being wrecked pose a
greater threat of becoming a serious obstruction in a channel. Also
today, there are more ships in operation, and therefore any obstruction
in a passage is more harmful in that it may adversely affect the rights
of a larger number of people. In view of this, it could be argued that
stricter liability should be imposed on wrongdoing shipowners so that
they will be more cautious and prudent in their use of navigable
waterways. If this enlightened approach were adopted, owners would
still be protected from personal liability for removal costs of ships
sunk without fault, and thereby continued encouragement would be
given to the maritime industry.
EDGAR H.

MACKINLAY

SUBORDINATION OF MORTGAGES FOR FUTURE
ADVANCES TO FEDERAL TAX LIENS
In United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co.' the United States Supreme Court for the first time clearly established that the choate rule
2
extends to a mortgagee's contractual lien and also to future advances
or contingent liabilities.3 The question of the applicability of the
choate doctrine in the situation where a mortgage competes with a
federal tax lien was left unsettled by the 1958 per curiam decision of
the Supreme Court in United States v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co.4 The
ambiguity of the Ball decision caused much speculation in the interim.
In Pioneer American, the taxpayers in 1958 duly executed a deed
of trust of certain real estate to secure a note held by the Pioneer
American Insurance Company. The deed of trust included a covenant
stipulating that, in case the mortgagor defaulted on the note, the
mortgagor would pay reasonable attorney's fees expended by the
a vessel owner can absolve himself from the burden of seeing that his vessel does
not become, by abandonment, a menace to navigation." In re Eastern Transp. Co.,
102 F. Supp. 913, 917 (D. Md. 1952).
1374 U.S. 84 (1936).
2
Glenn, Mortgages § 392-4o6.3 (1943); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 175-177 (1949).
3r9 C.J.S. Mortgages § 230 (1949).

'355 U.S. 587 (1958) (per curiam).
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mortgagee in any suit resulting therefrom. In October of ig6o the
taxpayers defaulted. The mortgagee filed a foreclosure suit on March
24, 1961, and asked for the principal and interest and a reasonable
attorney's fee. The United States was named a party defendant, since
on November 29, 196o, and January 20, 1961, it had filed two tax
liens against the taxpayer. It filed three additional tax liens on April
14, July 17, and October 3, 1961.
On November 15, 1961, an Arkansas Chancery Court fixed the
amount of the attorney's fee at $1,2oo, and awarded a priority over
the United States tax liens to the mortgagee for the principal and interest and the attorney's fee. The United States appealed to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, 5 conceding the mortgagee's priority as to the
principal and interest, but denying priority as to the lien for attorney's fees on the ground that it was inchoate at the time of the filing
of all the tax liens. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's decision that the attorney's fee was senior to the tax liens, on
the ground that it was an inherent part of, and thus related back to
the antecedent mortgage contract.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because of
a conflict between the Arkansas decision and two prior decisions in
the lower federal courts. 7 The Arkansas decision was reversed when the
Court held that a mortgage securing contingent liability, like a mortgage securing future advances, is in interest to which the choate test
can appropriately be applied. And, since the amount of the attorney's
lien was uncertain until entry of the decree of November 15, 1961,
which was subsequent to the attachment of all the tax liens, the attorney's lien was inchoate and subordinate to all the tax liens.
In order to appreciate the far-reaching effect of the Supreme
Court's extension of the choate lien doctrine to the field of mortgages
securing future advances, 8 it is necessary to examine the development
and subsequent extension of the choate rule.
A lien equal to the amount of the tax due arises in favor of the
Government upon all property and rights to property belonging to a
rUnited States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 235 Ark. 267, 357 S.W.2d 653 (1962).
'United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 909 (1962).
'United States v. Bond, 279 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1966); In re New Haven Clock
& Watch Co., 253 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1959) (holding the relation back doctrine inapplicable, and thus an attorney's lien must be perfected and certain).
8
Since the rationale applicable to mortgages securing future advances is also
applicable to mortgages securing contingent liabilities, the ensuing discussion will
be confined to mortgages securing future advances. 374 U.S. at 91; United States v.
Bond, supra note 7, at 846.
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delinquent taxpayer9 Ordinarily, the tax lien becomes effective as of
the date the assessment is made10 by the District Director of Internal
Revenue. 1 Since the lien is secret, 12 Congress, in order to prevent inequitable results, has given a special preference to mortgagees,
pledgees, purchasers, and judgment creditors by providing that the
tax lien does not become effective against these interests until notice
of the assessment has been filed in the appropriate place.' 3
The choate lien test was first applied by the Supreme Court in insolvency cases,' 4 where Congress expressly granted a priority to the
debts owed the United States, whether the debts were secured by
liens or not.15 The initial extension of the choate doctrine to statuInt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6321 (formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3670). Originally, the federal tax lien statutes were adopted to prevent the frustration of
tax collection processes by transfer of the taxpayer's assets before enforcement proceedings
could be instituted. See note, 63 Yale L.J. 905 (1954).
'1 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6322 (formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3671).
UInt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6203; Treas. Reg. § 3oi.62o1-1 (1954).
' Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6103, 7213.
M"mhe lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid as against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice thereof has been filed
by the Secretary or his delegate...." Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(a) (formerly Int.
Rev. Code of 1939, § 3672(a).
The original section, which is now § 6323(a) of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954, did
not include a purchaser.
In United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210 (1893), it was held that a tax lien
arising under the section which is now § 6321 was binding even against a bona fide
purchaser for value without knowledge or notice of the existence of such a lien.
Twenty years later, Congress amended the section which is now § 6323(a) to indude a purchaser. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(a).
The reason given for the amendment was: "[T]he lien is so comprehensive that
it covers all the property and rights to property of the delinquent situated anywhere
in the United States, and any person taking title to real estate is subjected to the
impossible task of ascertaining whether any person, who has at any time owned
the real estate in question, has been delinquent in the payment of the taxes referred
to while the owner of the real estate in question. The business carried on under the
internal-revenue law may be at a great distance from the property affected by
this secret lien, but this will not relieve the property from the lien." H.R. Rep.
No. ioiS, 62nd Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1912).
"The first reference to the choate lien test is found in County of Spokane v.
United States, 279 U.S. 8o (1929). The choate test was applied by the Supreme Court
in New York v. Maclay, 288 U.S. 290, 294 (1933) where, in the case of an insolvent
corporation, a claim for state franchaise taxes due but not liquidated was held
inchoate, "serving merely as a 'caveat' of a more perfect lien to come." Accord,
United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954); United States v. Gilbert
Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953); United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank,
340 U.S. 47 (195o); United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353
(1945); United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480 (1941).
1"Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or whenever the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the excutors or administra-
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tory liens came in 195o in United States v. Secitrity Trust and Say.
Bank.' 6 The Supreme Court held that an attachment lien was inchoate
until judgment, even though the California statute said it was perfected as of the time a copy of the writ was recorded. The tax lien,
attaching prior to judgment under section 6321 of the 1958 Internal
Revenue Code, was entitled to a priority. The Court justified this
unique application of the choate test by alluding to the intent of
Congress in enacting section 632 1.17 Since the California statute allows a period of three years to proceed to judgment after the writ
of attachment is recorded, the Court reasoned that there are many
contingencies, any one of which might prevent the termination of the
suit, and thus the lien was inchoate, as it was "merely a lis pendens
notice that a right to perfect a lien exists."' 8
The Security Trust case is also pertinent in the tax lien field for
its enunciation of the rule that the time when a lien becomes specific
and perfected is always a matter of federal law.' 9 However, if a state
court holds that a lien is inchoate, such a determination is nearly always conclusive upon review by the federal courts.20
In United States v. City of New Britain,2 1 the Supreme Court clarified the standards of the choate rule. The three prerequisites of choateness are satisfied when the identity of the lienor, the property subject
to the lien, and the amount of the lien are established. 22 The Court,
tors, is insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased, the debts due to
the United States shall be first satisfied; and the priority established shall extend
as well to cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient property to pay all his
debts makes a voluntary assignment thereof, or in which the estate and effects of an
absconding, concealed, or absent debtor are atttached by process of law, as to cases
in which an act of bankruptcy is committed." 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1954).
"340 us. 47 (950).
27 "If the purpose of the federal tax lien statute to insure prompt and certain
collection of taxes due the United States from tax deliquents is to be fulfilled, a similar rule [choateness] must prevail here." Id. at 51.
8Id. at 5o.
'OId. at 49; Accord, United States v. Vorreiter, 355 U.S. 15 (1957) (per curiam);
United States v. Arci, 348 U.S. 211 (1955); United States v. City of New Britain, 347
U.S. 81 (1954). This question is to be distinguished from the question of whether
the taxpayer has property or rights to property to which a federal tax lien could
attach, the determination of which is a matter of state law. United States v. Durham
Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522 (1960); Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960).
20Illinois v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 371 (1946); In Puissegur v. Yarbrough,
29 Cal. 2d 409, 412, 175 P.2d 830, 831 (1946), the determination of the California
Supreme Court that the attaching creditor, under the California statute creating an
attachment lien, derives only a potential right or a contingent lien, was regarded
as conclusive.
'1347 U.S. 81 (1954).
21
1d. at 84.
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having determined that certain municipal liens were choate prior to
emergence of the tax liens, applied the principle: "first in time is the
23
first in right."
It is worthy of note that although the New Britain case held the
lien choate, it imposed a strict double standard which required the
lien to be both prior in time and choate; 24 and it is the only Supreme
Court case to date which has subordinated a section 6321 tax lien to
a statutory lien. 255The strictness of the New Britain doctrine is illustrated by United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 2 6 which held that

a statutory mechanic's lien, upon which suit for enforcement had been
instituted, was inchoate as against a tax claim assessed prior to the
date judgment was rendered thereon.2 7
The first occasion to extend the doctrine of a nonstatutory contractual lien came in 1958 in United States v. R. . Ball Constr. Co.2s
A subcontractor, in return for a surety's performance bond covering
the completion of a housing project in Texas, assigned his rights to
payments due from the principal contractor. Later, the subcontractor
secured a second performance bond from the surety to cover a Kentucky project. Then in sequence: the Texas project was completed;
the United States filed a tax lien against the subcontractor before
the subcontractor was paid; the subcontractor defaulted on the Ken"Id. at 85. The doctrine is comprehensively summarized by Chief Justice Marshall in Rankin v. Scott, 25 U.S. 12 (Wheat.) 104, 105 (1827): "The principle is believed to be universal, that a prior lien gives a prior claim, which is entitled to
prior satisfaction, out of the subject it binds, unless the lien be intrinsically defective, or be displaced by some act of the party holding it, which shall postpone
him in a court of law or equity to a subsequent claimant."
2
"We think that Congress had this cardinal rule in mind when it enacted § 3670
[now § 6321], a schedule of priority not being set forth therein. Thus, the priority
of each statutory lien contested here must depend on the time it attached to the
property in question and became choate." Id. at 86; Accord, United States v. Bond,
S.upra note 7, at 844.
mUnited States v. Colotta, 35o U.S. 8o8 (1955) (mechanic's lien was definite;
however, the ']is pendens' notice required by statute had not been filed); United
States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955) (landlord's distress lien); United States v.
Liverpool & London-Globe Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 215 (1955) (garnishment lien); United
States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955) (attachment lien was contingent upon the outcome
of suit for damages).
2"35o U.S. 1oo (1956) (per curiam).
2-In his vigorous dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas stated that the majority opinion implied that a lien is never choate until reduced to judgment, and
that if this be the holding, it overruled United States v. New Britain. But, in his
dissent, he impliedly accepted the validity of the choate test in statutory lien
cases, while merely disagreeing with the majority as to the interpretation of the
term choate. See United States v. Bond, supra note 7, at 845.
355 U.S. 587 (1958) (per curiam).
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tucky project; and the surety paid an amount equal to its obligation
on the Kentucky project.
The contractor filed an interpleader action to determine whether
the tax lien, or the assignment to the surety, was entitled to a priority
in the retained fund. The lower courts gave the surety the status of
a mortgagee, as was appropriate under state law, and held that the
surety's claim was protected under present section 6323(a).29 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "the instrument being inchoate
was unperfected, the provisions of section [6323(a)] ... do not apply."230
As previously mentioned, the ambiguity of this cursory opinion resulted in considerable speculation, 3A but this has been resolved by
Pioneer American, wherein the Supreme Court said in reference to
the Ball decision:
"While disagreeing on the choateness of the particular assignment involved there, the Court was unanimous in applying
the choateness test to those seeking the protection of §
6323(a)."32
Moreover, the Court concluded that the mortgage in Ball was one
which secured future advances, the sums due the subcontractor having been assigned to the surety as security for any subsequent advances
the surety might make under the surety contract. The Court summarized Ball and its application to PioneerAmerican as follows:
"Ball therefore rejects as inchoate an assignee's or mortgagee's lien to secure future indebtedness of the taxpayer-debtor .... Likewise, when a mortgagee has a lien for an attorney's
fee which is uncertain in amount and yet to be incurred and
'It was then § 3672(a). R. F. Ball Constr. Co. v. Jacobs, 14o F. Supp. 6o (W.D.
Tex. 1956), aff'd sub nom. United States v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co., 239 F.2d 384
(5th Cir. 1956).
00Op. Cit. at 587.
31Mr. Justice Whittaker, with whom Justice Douglas, Burton and Harlan
joined in dissent, considered the assignment to be a valid mortgage, and so concluded that the surety was entitled to the protection of § 6323(a). Looking at the
assignment as a mortgage, they doubted that the Court would have held it inchoate due to the fact that the recordation requirement under the state fraudulent
conveyances act was not met for two reasons: first, the unique application of the
choate doctrine to § 6323(a) would merit a more elaborate opinion; second, the
majority supported its decision by citing the Security Trust and New Britain
cases, two cases which had no applicability to § 6323(a). United States v. R. F. Ball
Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587, 588-594 (1958).
But see United States v. Bond, supra note 7, at 845, where the majority of the
court held that the Ball case had applied the choate doctrine to § 6323 (a), and the
court suggests that the difference between the majority and the dissent was as to the
interpretation of the term choate.
='374 U.S. at go.
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paid, such a lien is inchoate and is subordinate to the intervening federal tax lien33 filed before the mortgagee's lien for
attorney's fee matures."
The rationale of the Supreme Court in Pioneer American represents a logical development of authority for the extension of the choate
rule to section 6323(a). It appears, however, that the Supreme Court
has misconstrued the intention of Congress by holding that the principal and interest of a mortgage is choate, while another integral part
of the mortgage, the right to attorney's fees, is at the same time inchoate. This misconstruction of the intent of Congress appears to be
the direct result of the Supreme Court's apparent confusion as to
what the word "mortgagee," as used in section 6323(a), actually denotes.
The Supreme Court in Pioneer American stated that the purpose
of section 6323(a) was to afford a greater degree of protection to certain interests by requiring the tax lien to be filed, not merely assessed.
Moreover, as the Court said, section 6323(a) deals with the priority
of the federal lien only, and does not specify the time at which nonfederal liens arise or become choate. It is difficult to agree, however,
that Congress, by granting a preferential status to certain liens in section 6323(a), intended "that they should at least have attained the
degree of perfection required of other liens and be choate for the
purposes of the federal rule."3 4 It appears that, inherent in this
statement, there lies confusion as to the meaning of the term "mortgagee" as used in the statute.
State courts have traditionally recognized the relation-back doctrine
as appropriately applicable in the field of mortgages which secure future advances. 35 The Supreme Court in Security Trust rejected the
applicability of the relation-back doctrine to statutory liens competing
with the section 6321 tax lien.30 And, in Pioneer American, the Supreme Court rejected the relation-back doctrine as applied to a mortgage securing future advances or contingent liability, when in com37
petition with a section 6323(a) tax lien.
It is submitted, however, that when Congress granted a preference
at 91.
'Id. at 89 .

3-id.

"See notes 42-44 infra.

"Nor can the doctrine of relation back-which by process of judicial reasoning merges the attachment lien in the judgment and relates the judgment lien back
to the date of attachment-operate to destroy the realities of the situation." 3-to U.S.
at 5o.
"374 U.S. at 92 n.h.
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to any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor, it used
these terms in the "usual and conventional sense," as was said in Hoare
v. United States.38 Two leading Supreme Court cases indicate that in
section 6323(a) Congress intended only the conventional usage of the
term "judgment creditor."' 9
Thus, it would seem that Congress also intended under section
6323(a) to apply the conventional interpretation of the word "mortgagee." The essential characteristic of a mortgage is that it is a security
transaction. In such a transaction the mortgagee does not receive absolute title but takes the property subject to the mortgagor's equity of
40
redemption.
The paramount question here is whether the purpose of Congress
in enacting section 6323(a) will be frustrated by granting recognition
to the conventional and historic rights of a mortgagee. Although
Congress intended by section 6323 to facilitate the collection of federal taxes, it appears doubtful that Congress intended to subvert a
well balanced security structure by such an enactment.
State courts have consistently recognized and validated mortgages
for future advances, as was noted in the dissenting opinion in United
States v. Bond:
"There is nothing novel in recognition of the fact that the
protection of the mortgage lien extends to such disbursements
and expenses [future advances], made pursuant to such provisions, as fully as to the principal of the mortgage debt itself.
It is a usual and conventional right of a mortgagee." 4' 1
Although there is conflict in the state courts, the prevailing view is
that a mortgagee who is contractually obligated to make future advances is accorded a senior status as to advances made subsequent to
the attaching of a junior lien, even though he has actual notice of the
junior lien; Mere voluntary advances, however, are not awarded
"8294 F.2d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1961).

-The Supreme Court made the following statement: "A cardinal principle
of Congress in its tax scheme is uniformity, as far as may be .... In this instance,
we think Congress used the words 'judgment creditor' in § 3672 [now § 6323] in
the usual, conventional sense of a judgment of a court of record, since all states
have such courts." United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. 361, 364 (1953).
The Supreme Court supported this proposition by saying: "The history of
this tax lien statute [§ 6323] indicates that only a judgment creditor in the conven-

tional sense is protected." United States v. Security Trust and Savings Bank, 340
U. S. at 52.
4OUnited States v. Gargil, 218 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1955) (distinguishing between a
valid mortgage and a sham which is in fact an attempted assignment for the benefit
of creditors).
,"United States v. Bond, 279 F.2d at 851.
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priority in competition with prior attaching liens.4 2 The justification
for this view is crystallized by the Supreme Court of Nevada:
"[WMe are of opinion that it would be manifestly unsound to
hold that plaintiff's actual notice or knowledge of the defendant's subsequent mortgage had the effect of taking from him
he was compelled by his
the security for advances and services
43
contract to make and perform."
Only Maryland has adopted by statute4 4 a rule similar to that enunciated by the Supreme Court in Pioneer American, and that statute has
45
been severly criticized.
The conventional interpretation of a mortgage securing future advances considers future advances to be an integral part of and inseparably connected with the rest of the mortgage contract. In sum,
the future advances are said to relate back to the date at which the
mortgage became effective. Consequently, the Supreme Court departed
from the congressional intent in using the word "mortgagee" in section 6323, by denying the doctrine of relation-back for a mortgage
securing future advances.
Strong policy considerations deny that a valid mortgage securing
future advances can be divided into two separate parts, one part being held choate and perfected and the other part being held inchoate
and unperfected. A mortgage is an indivisible security device, either
'2E.g., Ashdown Hardware Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ark. 541, 267 S.W.2d 294 (1954);
Simpson v. Simpson, 123 So. 2d 289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1g6o); Axel Newman Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Sauers, 234 Minn. 140, 47 N.W.2d 769 (1951); North v. McClintock, 208 Miss. 289, 44 So. 2d 412 (1950); Chartz v. Gardelli, 52 Nev. 1, 179 Pac.
761 (1929); Peaslee v. Evans, 82 N.H. 313, 133 At. 448 (1926); New York & Surburban
Fed. Say. 9- Loan Ass'n v. Fi-Pen Realty Co., 133 N.Y.2d 33 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
'3Chartz v. Cardelli, 52 Nev. 1, 279 Pac. 761, 763 (1929).
""No mortgage ...shall be a lien or charge on ...property for any other...
sum ... than the principal sum . . . that shall appear on the face of such mortgage

and be specified and recited therein, and particularly mentioned and expressed to
be secured thereby at the time of executing the same...; (and] no mortgage to
secure future loans or advances shall be valid unless the amount ... of the same and
the times when they are to be made shall be specifically stated in said mortgage...."
Md. Ann. Code art. 66 § 2 (1957).
",In re Shapiro, 34 F. Supp. 737 (D. Md. 1940) (the court, while expressing its
regret, held a mortgage for future advances void as contrary to Maryland law).
"Indeed, the Maryland statute... appears to be almost unique in the Englishspeaking world. It has never had a State-wide application in Maryland. In other
jurisdictions the controversy is not as to the validity of mortgages for future advances, but chiefly whether they should be preferred to the claims of subsequent
lienors, especially in cases where the lender was not obligated to made [sic]
such advances. However, the call for legislative change . . . has not been
Leister v. Carroll County Nat'l Bank, 199 Md. 241, 86 A.2d 393, 396
heeded.
(1952).

